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This paper uses an industry data set from the European Union, United States and Japan to investigate the degree 
to which banking regulation and institutional environment affects corporate finance choices. La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) have shown the influence of investor protection on financing decisions. We extend these measures 
of investor protection and develop a measure for banking regulation. We both confirm prior findings and provide 
additional evidence of “institutional effects”. We find that prudential banking regulation is positively associated 
with industry indebtedness, indicating that prudential rules make it easier for firms to access to credit market. 
Furthermore, we also find that disclosure rules affect leverage decisions.  
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  The empirical literature on corporate finance has shown that financial decisions 
depend on firm characteristics (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barclay and Smith, 1995, 
Cleary, 1999 and Wald, 1999) and most recently legal rules and the degree of investor 
protection are proved to be important determinants of capital structure (La Porta, 1997 
and 1998, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 and 1999; Carlin and Mayer, 2003, 
Lombardo and Pagano, 1999)
1. However, despite the growing interest of this area of 
research, thus far the literature present two weaknesses. First,  it has not paid much 
attention to other institutional arrangements that may affect financing decisions as well; 
namely banking regulation and transparency in the economy. This is surprising since the 
theoretical literature suggests that asymmetric information conditions credit 
relationships. Furthermore, the firm-banking relationships would be affected by the 
structure and strategic decisions of the banking sector. Second, the conclusions rely on 
partial institutional measures which are constant over time. Both questions are tackled 
in this paper.  
The objective of the paper is therefore, twofold. On the one hand, we empirically 
explore the role of banking rules and disclosure requirements in influencing capital 
structure decisions. We start from the literature showing the relationship between 
investor protection in financing decisions and then construct and introduce measures to 
account for the banking regulation and level of public information. On the other, we 
complete the existing measures of investor protection and incorporate the innovations 
passed when occurred. 
On addition to this, previous work has mostly relied on aggregated data or large 
firms, which have easier access to international capital markets and therefore are less 
subject to the institutional constraints imposed by domestic markets. Instead, we use 
industry-level panel data drawn from a cross-section of nine European countries, United 
States and Japan, therefore our data don´t have the aforementioned problem. 
Furthermore, as far as we are concerned, there are not previous papers that study jointly 
USA, Japan and a large sample of European countries. Besides, industry-level data have 
important advantages over both firm level and country-level data for the purpose at 
hand. To the extent that agency problems vary systematically across industries, the 
institutional developments on which we focus in this study may affect leverage levels 
                                                 
1 See in particular Giannetti (2003), who explores this relationship at firm level in eight European Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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differently in each industry. In this case, country-level data may mask the effects of 
interest because of aggregation. On merely statistical grounds, industry-level data are 
preferable to firm-level data mainly because of  the “survivorship bias”. This bias arises 
when firms with a long history are included in the sample (Lombardo, 2000). Since the 
sudden disappearance of an industry is a much rarer event, this problem is drastically 
alleviated by the use of industry indices.  
We find that investor protection influence leverage decisions, consistent with the 
existing results. Furthermore, banking regulations and disclosure requirements affect 
indebtedness of economic sectors in a significant way. In countries with better 
protection of creditors, problems associated to the lack of collateral assets are lessened, 
consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems are reduced in such scenarios. 
Furthermore, prudent banking regulation also reduce the need of fixed assets to attract 
external finance. Hence, investment in intangible assets that lead to faster growth may 
increase. Therefore, improvements in the institutional framework reduce financial 
constraints and may foster sector performance. Beyond their academic interest, these 
conclusions are of use to policymakers engaged in institutional design. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
the relevant theoretical relations found between firm leverage and institutional variables 
as well as the correlations with industry attributes. Section 3 describes the construction 
of the legal variables and the data set. The statistical model and the results are presented 
in section 4. The sensitivity and robustness analyses are reported in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.- Related literature and hypothesis 
A main branch of theoretical finance literature analyses the effect that 
asymmetric information has on financial decisions, and the difficulties caused by 
incomplete contracts
2. In empirical studies, firm attributes have been traditionally used 
as proxies of asymmetric information in credit relations. Table 1, panel A summarises 
the standard results and collects the usual proxy. The institutional framework claim, 
however, that institutional arrangements affect the agency problems associated to credit 
relationships (La Porta et al., 1997). Creditor rights play a role in determining how 
                                                                                                                                               
countries and also distinguishes between company size 
2 See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey. Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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much the presence of collateral can favour the choice of debt over equity. Given a 
certain level of asymmetric information, lender ability to recover their loans (or the 
collateral) is also important. If the legal protection of creditors in not adequate, they 
may be reluctant to lend. If creditors do not have the right to require collateral or cannot 
effectively repossess collateralized assets, interest rates will raise in response to these 
agency problems and if that is not enough to cover the opportunity cost of lending, the 
credit market may even collapse. The strict protection of creditors rights leads to 
cheaper credit. Consequently, as pointed out by Padilla and Requejo (1998), many 
valuable investment projects, which would not be funded because of moral hazard 
problems, may be financed when the debtor is allowed to commit his own wealth to the 
repayment of debts. Furthermore, Fabbri (2001) using a general equilibrium model 
shows that firms located in countries which provide stronger legal protection to creditor 
rights, have access to a larger external financing, therefore affecting positively debt 
maturity.  
 Apart  from  the  increasing  ex ante efficiency of credit markets, strict protection 
of creditors also raises efficiency ex post. This effect is connected to the bankruptcy 
procedure. When borrowers can decide on reorganisation without creditor consent, 
liquidation may not take place even when it is efficient. Therefore, strict protection of 
creditor rights to be repaid with absolute priority eliminates the possibility of this kind 
of ex post overinvestment problem (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991). Henceforth, strict 
protection has positive effects on leverage levels. However, there are other theories that 
consider that strict enforcement of creditor rights may lead to inefficiencies both ex ante 
and ex post. Collateral rights might lead to underinvestment in project evaluation by 
banks (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001), or collateral repossession may reduce 
project control by lenders (Bebchuk and Fried, 1996). As a consequence, many 
unworthy projects may be funded and bankruptcy cases will increase.  In case of 
default, if creditor rights are strictly enforced, they will have no incentives to allow their 
debtors to restructure financially although it may be efficient to keep assets in debtor 
hands. The empirical evidence seems to agree with the former view, see Giannetti 
(2003). 
  The theoretical literature has analysed the effects of shareholder rights as well. 
Shareholder rights are related to capital market development. Investor protection is 
crucial because expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders 
is generally present in modern corporations. Expropriation is connected to agency Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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problems, as well as the legal system (Jensen and Mecking, 1976). Grossman and Hart 
(1988) point out the relevance of residual power of investors (guaranteed by legal 
framework) in order to partly mitigate distortion practices from insiders. Legal 
protection of shareholders makes expropriation practices less efficient. As investor 
protection improves, the insiders must engage in more distorted and wasteful diversion 
practices (La Porta et al., 1999c). When investors are protected from expropriation, they 
pay more for securities, making this form of external finance more attractive for 
entrepreneurs, who will issue more securities. Therefore, shareholder protection 
encourages the development of equity markets measured by the valuation of firms, 
listed companies and the rate at which firms go public (La Porta et al. 1999b). A 
positive relation between shareholder protection and corporate valuation has been 
shown recently through different modelling (Gorton and Schmid, 1996 and La Porta et 
al. 1999b). Better protection of shareholders implies lower firm costs in participating to 
equity markets (Pagano, 1989). Henceforth, higher shareholder protection will 
encourage firms to float capital and reduce debt levels. In this context, the allocation of 
resourses in fixed assets reduce its relevance to obtain external finance.  
Besides investor protection, banking regulation is relevant for the lender-
borrower relationship as well. Financial intermediation is a response to the inability of 
market mechanisms to efficiently solve informational asymmetries in this relation. As 
pointed out by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), the frictions associated to incomplete 
information generate instability problems in financial markets that can be reduced with 
the adequate regulation.  
Banking regulation is mainly justified to protect the interests of small 
shareholders who do not have access to information (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) and 
to set up a security belt for the banking system so as to avoid financial crises and the 
negative externalities associated (Freixas y Rochet, 1997). Rate controls, entry 
restrictions, charter limitations of banks or separation of commercial and investment 
banking have been widely used by regulators to limit competition (Matutes and Vives, 
1995), since competition has traditionally been considered a source of excessive risk 
taking in banking. In this sense, some governments have even encouraged collusive 
agreements among banks. Recent empirical research on European banking highlights 
the importance of imperfect competition in the sector (Neven and Röller, 1994). 
Norms that restrict competition have been modelled in different settings with 
similar results. Suarez (1993) develops a model that demonstrates that this particular Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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type of banking regulation creates barriers to entry, which protect and enhance the 
exercise of monopoly power. Petersen and Rajan (1995) claim that more firms should 
be able to obtain credit from financial institutions in areas where credit market are more 
concentrated. Furthermore, the average quality of firms obtaining finance should be 
lower as the credit market becomes more concentrated. Caminal and Matutes (1997) 
find that total loans are related to market power as well. Under asymmetric information, 
banks optimally choose between restricting the loan size or monitoring firm decisions. 
Loan size may decrease with market power but the incentive to exert monitoring effort 
increases. Unless monitoring costs are prohibitively high, their model suggests that 
market power enhances welfare. That is, some degree of market power is likely to 
reduce the expected lending rate and extend credit since it increases the probability that 
loans will take the form of information based credit. The length of the bank-firm 
relationship also increases. Therefore, the expected effect of prudential banking 
regulation on leverage and maturity structure is positive.  
The level of public information can affect financing decisions in different ways. 
On the one hand, disclosure requirements are good proxies for the extent of asymmetric 
information within a country. Therefore, firms investing in intangible assets should have 
easier access to debt in countries with better accounting standards and stricter 
information requirements. On the other, when information is public, its cost decreases, 
investment profitability increases, and consequently investors are encouraged to invest 
(Subrahmanyan and Titman, 1999). Furthermore, agency problems between managers 
and shareholders reduce, as the incentives to extract rents by managers decrease 
(Pagano and Röell, 1998) and firms are encouraged to raise capital from the stock 
markets, and consequently, debt levels may reduce. Yet, if disclosure requirements are 
pretty demanding, floating incentives decrease sharply (Campbell, 1979) and the latter 
effect reduce. Therefore, information disclosure effects on leverage are not obvious ex 
ante.  
Finally, the institutional factor that traditionally has been considered to affect 
leverage levels is tax distortion. Higher corporate tax levels tend to favour the use of 
debt, while non-debt tax shields such as depreciation deductions can be used as 
substitutes for debt tax advantage and therefore reduce the leverage level of firms. Table 
1, panel B collects the results. 
The results commented provide support for the institutional effect as a 
complementary explanation of the finance decisions. We expand previous studies to test Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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these effects. First, we use international standardised data for a wide sample, and we test 
the main capital structure results jointly with the institutional effect. Second, and related 
to the latter, the measures of the institutional environment used in the literature are not 
always satisfactory. The indexes are partial, since they only include some norms and are 
constant through time. We improve the construction of the institutional variables by 
taking into account for the legal changes as well. 
   
3.- Data and variables included 
To capture the empirical relationship between the institutional environment and 
leverage decisions, we use data from different sources. 
 
3.1. Institutional Variables 
La Porta et al. (1998a) develop an index for creditor protection and another for 
investor protection and construct a measure for the origin of laws. The creditor and 
investor protection indexes are developed from bankruptcy and company regulations. 
Both indexes, as the authors recognise, are not complete. There are other laws that 
affect directly the level of investor protection which are not taken into account in these 
indexes. We try to fill this gap by analysing additional economic norms in order to be 
closer to the true structural environment. We have analysed merger and acquisition 
laws, accountancy regulations, auditing norms, disclosure requirements and banking 
regulations. With this information, following the methodology developed by La Porta et 
al. (1998a), we have constructed several indexes to measure shareholder and creditor 
protection, banking degree of prudence and protection and disclosure requirements.  
The method of construction is the same for all four indexes. Using accounting 
and legal literature
3, we define different categories which summarise the protection to 
investors, public intervention in banking and the quantity of information that has to be 
public respectively, present in the rules cited. For every country and each category we 
sum one unit when the feature is present and zero otherwise. Afterwards, we sum for 
each index and obtain the result for every country. We have taken into account changes 
                                                 
3 On corporate law: Hawkins and Morton, (1990) and Raybould and  Firth Ed. (1991).  
On accounting: Alexander and Archer (1992) and Blake and Amat (1993). 
On banking and financial markets: Interbank Research Organization (1978), Moreiro (1992), Parejo, 
Calvo and Paul (1993), Campbell and Moore (1993), Forestieri and Mottura (1998) and Katayama and 
Makov (1998). Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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in legislation in order to obtain time series differences and not only cross-country 
variations. 
Henceforth, shareholder protection index, “share”, has 9 categories. These 
categories include the La Porta et al. ones: mail voting allowed for general meeting; no 
need to deposit the shares before voting, cumulative voting allowed, protection to small 
shareholders, preemptive right to buy new issues of stock and finally the required 
percentage  to  attend  a  shareholder  meeting  is  inferior  to  10%.  After  the  review  of  
national merger law, we include three new categories: equal treatment of shareholders 
in case of mergers, control of directors’ activities and forbidden manager protection 
practices
4 (such as poison pills when they impose restrictions to shareholder rights
5). 
The new creditor index, “cred”, ranges between 0 and 5, being the categories: “stay on 
assets” procedure allowed, no priority to other stakeholders (employees, government or 
public entities), managers are not allowed to begin the reorganisation process without 
the consent of creditors, creditors have the right to impose an external administrator and 
finally explicit protection in merger procedures. For both indexes higher values are 
associated to better protection. USA is the country with the maximum shareholder 
protection, scoring 8. Belgium presents the minimum value 1. In relation to creditor 
index, Denmark presents a score of 4 being the maximum, and France with a 0 value is 
the minimum. Panel A of table 2 presents the construction of these variables.  
Following Allen and Gale (1995) we have analysed the main features of banking 
regulation, through nine categories
6 in order to account for the competition restriction in 
the banking sector. The nine categories can be subdivided in 3 groups according to their 
main goal. The first group refers to control of activity. Namely, need of license to 
establishment activity (charter), together with warranted social benefit, board of 
directors minimal skills and distinction
7, control on merger activities and branch 
                                                 
4 In this case we add one unit when the protective tactics are not permitted, in order to maintain the 
internal coherence of the index.  
5 In the case of United States, we sum one unit because the use of pills are not absolute: “managers can 
use defensive tactics only to the extent that is reasonable in relation to the threat posed and always 
protecting shareholder rights (Unocal Test, 1985). The Delaware courts also indicated that they protect 
against managerial moves to impede voting by shareholders to remove them. On the contrary, some 
European countries allow shareholder voting rights restrictions (France) or the “creative use of share 
capital” (Netherlands).  
6 Similar categories have also been used in a study on European banking regulation developed by 
Interbank Research Organization (1978). Parejo et al. (1993) has used this idea of categories to analyse 
banking regulation as well. More recently, Barth et al. (2001) have analysed different aspects of banking 
market structure and banking rules in a similar vein.  
7 Chartering requirements have been traditionally used to restrict entry and competition (Mishkin, 2000). Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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openings. The second group controls activity scope: separation of banking activities and 
other financial activities, and restriction to participate other firms. The third group refers 
to risk control in a double sense: own share tenure restrictions and control of large loans 
and their accumulation in one person. Therefore, “bank” will range between zero and 
nine when none or all categories are present in a national system. Higher values imply 
tighter restrictions to competition. Values for each category and each country are shown 
in table 2, panel B
8.  
Disclos captures the information firms are required to disclose. We analyse the 
need of compulsory disclosure in four different situations: merger, auditing, deciding to 
go public as well as the contents of annual accounts. Thus, “disclos” will range from 0 
to 4. Accordingly, higher values of “disclos” imply more information available to 
markets and investors. When comparing “disclos” values, a great uniformity is 
observed among European countries. The constitution treaty of the European 
Community (1952) established the mutual recognition of national firms. Harmonisation, 
however, has not finished yet, even though there are some fields where it has evolved 
more quickly. Information requirement is one of the most homogeneous fields. The 
main work has been made on public firm information related to mergers and acquisition 
of companies, annual account balance and auditory norms
9.  Panel C of table 2 presents 
the score and time changes. La Porta et al (1998) already use an index to account for the 
level of public information. This index is constructed through the analysis of 1990 
annual accounts of a sample of companies; at least three companies for each country are 
included. However, no information is given upon company size or the exact number of 
companies included per country. Therefore, this index could represent the practice of 
some firms alone and not the relevance of the information published by firms in a 
country. Our index instead is based on existing laws, thus entailing all companies.       
With the inclusion of these variables, we have come closer to the real 
institutional environment faced by firms along the 1990-1999 period. We have not 
included any variable for the origin of the law, although present in previous articles. As 
Rajan and Zingales (2001) point out, legal origin does not have a constant explanatory 
power over time due to legal innovations and reforms. Therefore, we are not sure that 
                                                 
8 Some of the categories are present in all the countries. Although, they do not allow us to distinguish 
between the different nature of banking law, we have included them in order to cover the main aspects of 
the national regulation.  
9 European Interior Market Review 1993.  Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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the legal origin still has an explanatory power, when legal systems continuously change 
to adapt to new scenarios. 
The analysis of the legal innovations in the 1990-1999 period, is especially 
relevant for disclosure requirements and banking regulation. With regard to disclosure 
rules, it can be observed that they have become stricter for Denmark and Netherlands 
since 1993. In connection to banking law, American innovations suppose a tendency 
towards higher geographical competition and fewer restrictions
10. The remaining norms 
have remained stable since the Eighties, when major changes took place.  
 
3.2. Leverage and sector attributes  
Our sample includes 11 developed countries
11. Data come from the BACH
12 
database, created within the European Committee of Central Banks. The main 
advantage of these data is the comparability of data, so that the robustness of the results 
is assured. All data come from book information, hence, it is not possible to evaluate the 
market values of debt ratios. However, it is generally admitted that the book value of 
leverage is the result of the management´s financial decisions. Moreover, previous 
empirical papers (Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Boot et al,. 2000) do not find 
significant differences in factors correlated with debt to book and market capital. The 
period considered is 1990-1999. The main features of the data described in Appendix 1.   
The ratios included are: 
 
Leverage is calculated as total debt on assets. Total debt includes banking credit, trade 
creditors and debenture loans. 
Maturity is calculated as the ratio of long term debt on total debt. 
Profitability is the standard return on assets ratio: Profit before tax plus interest and 
depreciation over total assets.
   
Collateral captures tangible assets to total assets.  
Non-debt tax shields:  Depreciation and provision
13 level over total assets.  
                                                 
10  Geographical controls for branch establishment have been present until 1997. The Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act enables banks to establish branches and buy other banks 
across the country. The passing of this act ends up a long deregulatory process. The deregulation process 
had started in 1978. By 1993, the state-level deregulatory process was essentially completed: all states but 
Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota allowed statewide branching, and all states but Hawaii permitted out of 
state bank holding companies to enter (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997). Therefore, branching restrictions 
only disappear in 1997, despite almost all American banking economists had agreed for over two decades 
that such a measure would improve the efficiency of the banking sector. A similar debate has taken place 
during the nineties concerning the repealing of Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-Steagall Act was finally 
repealed in 2000. 
11 Germany, France, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, USA, and Japan. 
12 Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised. It contains sector data since 1985.  
13 Depreciation and provisions of non financial fixed assets. Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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Industry growth opportunities: The growth rate of value added at time t, between t and 
t-1.   
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the main ratios included. Data confirm 
the cross-country differences accounted in previous papers (Wald, 1999 and Giannetti, 
2003). The US presents the lowest leverage ratio. On the contrary, Japan and Italy have 
the highest debt ratio. Both countries guarantee higher protection to creditors and their 
degree of banking prudence is above the average according to table 2.A.  However, the 
level of collateralised assets in Italy is in the lowest quartile. This preliminary evidence 
suggests that collateral assets may be less important when creditor rights are protected 
and when there is a certain degree of market power in the banking market. Therefore, 
institutional arrangements may play a role in explaining financial decisions. 
The differences in debt maturity are more pronounced, Italy presents the lower 
maturity and US the largest; yet,  the cross country differences decrease slightly when 
we only include manufacturing sectors in the computation. As panel C shows, services 
sectors present relevant differences to the industry sectors. A possible explanation is 
that manufacturing firms compete more worldwide while service firms compete more in 
their home countries, and therefore, maintain their particular features. This implies that 
firm characteristics are still important for understanding cross country differences in 
capital structure. 
 
4.-Estimation method and results 
The two previous sections suggest that financial decisions are affected by the 
institutional settings where sectors are operating in, not only by investor protection but 
by the banking norms and the transparency in the economy. These four institutional 
factors (altogether) have not been empirically investigated yet. Here, we want to test 
two hypothesis: whether agency problems are mitigated in protected environments and 
therefore incentives to invest in collateralised assets decrease and whether these 
arrangements influence the maturity structure of debt and therefore facilitate external 
finance availability. For the empirical test, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Leveragei,j,t=a + b * industry attributesi,j,t+ g*INSTi,t +  + hij + yt +ei,j,t                              (1) 
 
where i = 1,…, n refers to countries, j = 1,…, m refers to economic sectors and t = 1,…, 
T to time periods. The error term, ei,j,t  is identically distributed and uncorrelated across Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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observations and with exogenous variables, but cov (ei,j,t,ei,j,s) may be different from 
zero if t= s. To take into account sector cross-sectional differences that are not observed 
or are invariant over time, we include fixed effects
14. In particular, we include industry 
and country effects and time effect (hij, yt respectively). These fixed effects also help to 
control for possible data problems due to the definitions of balance sheets items in 
BACH. Even if there are cross-country differences in data treatment, they are not likely 
to vary much over time and, therefore, the conclusions regarding the effects of industry 
attributes on corporate finance decisions are not affected.  
The fixed effect estimator provides unbiased estimates of the parameters of 
interest by taking all the variables in deviation from the individual mean and exploiting 
only the time-series variability
15.  In addition to including sector indicators and country 
indicators, we include some interaction terms in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
and Claessens and Laeven (2003) among others. In particular, we interact an 
institutional factor with an industry characteristic. Apart from using the values of the 
institutional measures, in the interaction terms, we also use dummy variables associated 
with these indicators, which group countries above and below the average and facilitate 
the interpretation of the results. 
Once we have tested the institutional effects on leverage and agency problems, 
we turn to debt maturity. Debt maturity is interesting to analyse because of the 
differences evidenced in the summary statistic from the data  and because it is expected 
to be affected by debt levels, and therefore, by the institutional environment. Firm 
attributes and also the structure and concentration of the banking systems are said to 
influence maturity, because it influences the nature of bank-firm relationships. The 
equation to estimate is: 
Maturityi,j,t=a + b*OHYHUDJH/* industry attributesi,j,t+ g*banking structure featuresi,t  
+ hij + yt +ei,j,t                                             (2) 
Debt maturity and banking structure may affect each other, since the structure of 
the banking system conditions the funds supply. To reduce the possibility of 
endogeneity in the specification, we estimate the maturity equation using two-stages 
                                                 
14 The Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the random effect estimator is consistent, because 
individual fixed effects are correlated with the explicative variables in both equations. When correlation is 
present, conditional inference must be done (fixed effect estimation) [Arellano y Bover, 1990].  
15 In some of the specifications, however, we only include industry effects in order to be able to estimate 
g, the parameter of interest. In these cases, we include country dummies to account for unobservable 
variables. Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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least squares. Additionally, we test the effects of banking regulation and creditor 
protection in the maturity structure through interaction terms.  
Following the papers by Mayer (1988) and Frankel and Montgomery (1991) to 
account for the banking concentration, we use the assets of three largest banks as a share 
of assets of all commercial banks in the system. To account for the size and capacity of 
entities, we will use level of deposits. Investment strategy is measured by the quantity 
of shares and participations in non-financial firms. The data come from the OCDE 
database. 
 
4.1. Investor protection and banking regulation 
In table 4, we present results for equation 1 without interaction effects. We 
report for brevity only the coefficients of interest, namely the institutional variables and 
the industry attributes said to influence leverage levels. Standard errors and t-statistics 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. We introduce one institutional feature at a time and 
in the last column we introduce them all.   
For the most part, the data supports the traditional theories of corporate finance 
and industry characteristic affect significantly leverage levels. Profitability, measured 
by the return on assets presents a positive and significant coefficient in all runs. This is 
coherent with Jensen´s theory of free cash flow (1986). No support for the pecking 
order theory is found in any of the specifications. Collateral assets do not seem to be 
universally relevant to ease the access to external credit, being non significant in column 
(1) and (2). Future growth opportunities can be considered an intangible assets that 
requires external financing. Previous studies show a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage, that is future growth opportunities are financially 
through stock markets. However, this result may be driven by the excessive weight of 
listed firms in the sample used. We, instead, find a positive and significant coefficient, 
meaning that industries become more leveraged as their growth opportunities improve. 
This effect may be stronger in countries with less developed stock market, such that 
firms with growth opportunities are not able to issue new capital and fund growth. Size, 
proxied by the logarithm of total assets is positive and significant except for the first and 
second columns. Finally, the coefficient of non debt tax shield is negative and 
significant as expected. Hence, the evidence is consistent with previous findings . 
With respect to the legal variables, all coefficients are significant both one at a 
time and when they are introduced at the same time. Banking regulation affects Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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positively and significantly leverage levels as predicted by direct regulation models, 
therefore a certain degree of market power improves lending relationships between 
banks and economic sectors (column1). The quantity of public information, disclos 
presents a negative significant coefficient, meaning that the quality of information 
affects leverage negatively, consistent with the results by Subrahmanyan and Titman, 
(1979), who claim that when information is public, its cost decreases, investment 
profitability increases, and consequently investors are encouraged to invest. Hence, 
better information can lead to higher participation in equity markets, reducing debt 
levels. The third column collects the results for the shareholder protection. Shareholder 
rights affect negatively leverage. As we have previously claimed, when external 
investors are protected from expropriation, they are willing to invest and securities 
become more attractive for entrepreneurs as costs of floating decreases and can avoid 
the discipline of debt (Pagano, 1989). Creditor protection has a positive effect on debt 
levels, as expected by the main stream of financial literature, Padilla and Requejo 
(1998), that is, better protection provides cheaper credit that seems to drive to higher 
debt levels. Finally, column 5 presents the results for the complete set of variables. All 
the variables are significant and maintain the signs just commented. Therefore, the legal 
variables that affect directly the financial intermediaries increases credit availability, 
whereas, the factors more related to the development of stock market, seem to 
discourage debt decisions. Another interesting remark, is that, when legal factors are 
introduced in the analysis, collateral assets do not seem to be so crucial to access credit. 
Therefore, the legal terms may influence the investment decisions. 
  
As an additional investigation into the channels through which legal 
arrangements affect investment decisions, we include the interaction terms. On the one 
hand, we analyse whether creditor protection and banking regulation affects the 
necessity of collateral assets. We want to see if collateral needs are less demanding in 
countries where creditors an financial intermediaries are protected. On the other, we 
interact growth opportunities with the legal features associated to stock market 
development (shareholder protection and disclosure requirements). In this case, we 
control if high growth sectors reduce indebtedness levels in countries with more 
transparency and better protection to shareholders, that is, they are able to issue new 
capital to finance growth. Results are collected in table 5, panel A and B.   
Panel A presents the results for the interaction between banking law and creditor Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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protection and collateral assets. The interaction terms reported are constructed with the 
dummy variables associated to the legal factors. Results show that legal environment 
affects the extent of agency problems. Prudent banking regulation enhances leverage 
levels and furthermore reduces the importance of collateral assets significantly (column 
1). Furthermore, the collateral coefficient is not significant. Therefore, economic sectors 
operating in countries with more prudent banking laws are less constrained to invest in 
tangible assets in order to access credit. Moreover, those sectors more R+D intense can 
develop more easily in such a setting. Creditor protection, (column 3) confirms the 
positive significant effect on leverage previously obtained and  besides, the interaction 
term (cred2) is negative and significant; that is good creditor protection favours access 
to credit to those sectors investing in intangible assets.  The results when we include the 
complete set of legal variables are similar (column 2 and 4), although the banking 
interaction term is not significant. The results when we introduce the interaction term 
with the value of the legal variables (not reported) remain unchanged. 
Panel B of table 5 presents the results for the other set of interaction variables, 
those related to growth opportunities. The interaction term of disclosure requirements is 
only significant when all the legal factors are included in the regression, column2. Only 
in this case, we can argue that high growing sectors (with more growth opportunities) 
operating in countries with more developed stock markets will reduce the debt finance. 
The interaction term of the shareholder protection is not significant. Therefore, better 
shareholder protection affects negatively leverage levels, that is, being debt and equity 
somehow substitutes, better protection to external shareholder makes more attractive to 
resort the stock market to raise capital; however, we do not find an heterogeneous effect 
across sectors. Henceforth, the secondary effects of the variables related to the stock 
market development on debt levels are weaker. 
 
4.2. Banking regulation and banking structure 
In the estimation of equation (2), we use only smaller industries
16, as they are 
supposed to be more credit constrained, have less access to credit markets and therefore 
have less influence on banking structures. The results are presented in table 6. Debt 
maturity depends positively on the profitability. The ability to provide collateral assets 
                                                 
16 By smaller sectors we include the BACH classification of small and medium sizes. The reason of 
including both levels is to obtain a more homogeneous category along the sample. The results obtained 
using the only small size do not change significantly.  Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
 
21 
also lengthens debt maturity. Size affects maturity negatively. Therefore, larger 
industries have easier access to stock markets and present lower levels of long term 
debt. Leverage ratio and future growth opportunities do not seem to affect debt maturity 
structure. The former result changes with the introduction of the creditor interaction 
effect (column 3). In this run, the more leveraged firms present shorter length debt, 
indicating that most of smaller sectors leverage ratios are short term debt contracts.  In 
connection to the banking structure variables, evidence is mixed. The strategic decisions 
of banking influence debt maturity. While share tenure affects negatively, industry 
participations increase debt maturity. Therefore, the establishment of close ties between 
banks and firms increases the maturity of debt levels, as suggested by standard results of 
the banking theory. Finally, the coefficient of concentration is weakly significant, 
however, it is significant when we distinguish between countries above and below the 
average degree of prudence in banking regulations (column 2). Therefore, in this case, 
concentration in the banking sector presents positive effects on maturity, although we 
can not evidence a differential effect associated to the banking law. In column 3, we 
introduce the interaction between the creditor protection level and banking 
concentration. Again there is no direct effect of the banking  concentration, yet in those 
countries with better creditor protection, concentration has a positive effect on maturity 
as expected.   
 
5. Robustness 
Now, we present a battery of tests we have realised to check the robustness of 
the results. Particularly, we check the results obtained in specification (1), because we 
have used the complete sample and therefore we can analyse the correlations evidenced 
in different subsamples. First, we check if the conclusions reported are sensitive to the 
size of national sectors or to the industries included. Afterwards, we check if there are 
countries that are particularly influential for getting the previous results. 
 
5.1. Size Analysis 
Until now, we have analysed all sector sizes without distinction. However, size 
has been proved to be an important conditioning factor for debenture levels. Henceforth, 
it is important to examine if the general correlations found are valid, when taking 
particular sector sizes independently. Then, we separate the economic sectors into two 
categories: large sectors on the one hand and small and medium on the other. Financial Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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patterns are said to be affected by firm size (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Moreover, 
reputation (proxied by sector size) may alleviate information asymmetries and thus can 
improve access to credit (Giannetti, 2003). Moreover, large sectors usually can have 
access to international capital markets reducing their dependence on national economic 
grounds. Therefore, focusing specially on larger sectors, we might expect less important 
effect of legal scenario on leverage. Table 7 collects the results for the smaller
17 sectors 
and table 8 for the larger industries. 
For the smaller industries, the signs and significance of the legal variables 
remain qualitatively similar to those obtained with the whole sample. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the coefficients changes. On the one hand, the creditor protection is more 
important to smaller sectors, as evidenced by the greater coefficient. On the other, 
disclosure requirements, banking norms and shareholder protection reduce their effects 
on leverage decrease. This first result is confirmed in the interaction analysis. The only 
term that is significant is the one relative to creditor protection. This effect is more 
pronounced than in the total sample Those small industries in higher creditor protection 
countries are less subject to invest in collateralised assets.  
Table 8 presents the results for the larger sectors. Profitability presents a 
negative and significant coefficient supporting pecking order predictions for larger 
industries. This result is consistent with the major evidence in the literature and 
confirms the idea that previous results were adapted to larger firms; therefore when 
including smaller sectors conclusions differ. The other industry feature coefficients 
remain qualitatively similar. Related to the legal variables, all of them are significant 
and except for the creditor protection maintain the expected signs. Creditor protection 
presents in some realisations a negative sign, consistent with the orthodox view. 
Therefore, larger sectors that can have access to stock markets, reduce their debt when 
creditor protection is too strict. However, when we distinguish the countries according 
to their protection, the coefficient is again positive and the need of collateral is lower for 
those sectors operating in the high protected countries. Banking regulation effect is 
more pronounced for larger sectors and their needs of collateral to access the credit 
market in prudent banking countries are less demanding. Therefore, the firm-banking 
relationships may be easier the larger the firm. 
  
                                                 
17 We use again the size category: small and medium (SME) when we talk about smaller sectors. Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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5.2. Manufacturing industries and influential countries 
Finally, we check if results are affected by the sectors or countries included. 
Results are presented in table 9 and 10 respectively. Manufacturing sectors replicate 
mainly the results for the total sample. The main difference is the negative relation 
found between profitability and leverage levels, coherent with the pecking order 
hypothesis. Banking regulation is more important to manufacturing sectors, and both the 
direct and secondary effect present higher coefficients. Therefore, prudent banking 
regulation encourages more the manufacturing leverage levels, and those sectors 
operating in such a setting need less collateral to access credit market. Finally, the last 
check we have realised is to show if any country disproportionately influences the 
previous results. No strong differences emerge when we exclude the various countries. 
The major differences are that creditor protection is not significant when we eliminate 
Netherlands and information quality is not significant any more when USA is dropped 
from the analysis. Therefore, results seem pretty robust to the different tests we have 
realised. Table 10 collects the results.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
  Recent contributions claimed with reasonable confidence that institutional 
environment matters for financial decisions. Beyond this general characterisation of 
institutions there is a complex structure of rules and economic norms, which shape 
capital structure. The extent of banking regulation is, in our opinion, part of the most 
important determinants of such relationship, and it had not been investigated yet. 
Furthermore, economic rules evolve and the innovations should also be taken into 
account.   
On the one hand, this paper incorporates the banking regulation and disclosure 
requirements to the analysis of corporate finance decisions. Our findings suggest a 
significant impact of both banking regulation and disclosure requirements. Besides, we 
find evidence that creditor protection has a positive effect on firm indebtedness. This 
finding is consistent with the theoretical predictions and previous empirical work. 
Furthermore, we find in countries with higher protection to creditors and prudent 
banking regulations, agency problems are alleviated, since sectors’ need of collateral to 
secure credits is lower. Therefore, designing an adequate banking regulation and 
protection to creditors helps to overcome the problems associated to asymmetric 
information. Moreover, reputation and growth opportunities always facilitate the access Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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to credit. Disclosure requirements and shareholder protection that enhance stock market 
development have a detrimental effect on leverage levels. These effects are robust to 
different subsamples; even though, we find some different patterns associated to size. 
Banking regulation is more important to large sectors, while creditor protection for 
smaller ones. The effect of profitability also seems to depend on size. These conclusions 
also take into account the legal reforms passed during the period.   
The maturity analysis shows the relevance of the banking structure. 
Concentration has a positive effect on leverage length. In particular, in those countries 
above the average in banking regulation. This result supports models predicting that 
maintaining a certain degree of market power in banking facilitates the development of 
lending relationships. This result is more important if we bear in mind empirical 
evidence on maturity debt structure and banking structure. Short-termism is an endemic 
feature of capital structure, at least in many European countries (Debreil et al, 1996). 
Furthermore, European banking systems are characterised by the monopolistic 
competition (Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000). Hence designing an adequate banking law 
is particularly important for external finance. 
 To  sum  up,  the  consideration  of  banking  regulations  and  other  institutional 
variables significantly improves the understanding of capital structure decisions. 
Therefore, future work has to continue this line of research, fully incorporating other 
economic factors. Additional attention should be paid to the effects of industry sector, 
whose relation with the institutional environment has to be deepened. In connection to 
the banking structure, there are other features, different from the legal scenario, that are 
also relevant for the development of this economic sector. Public ownership of bank 
holdings or significant public presence in the banking sector is one of these. Actually, in 
some of the countries analysed the public participation is quite relevant (e. g. Spain). 
Therefore, the inclusion of this factor in the lending process analysis should shed new 
light in the knowledge of capital structure. Finally, and given the recent branch of 
literature on the relationship between institutions and economic growth, we consider 
interesting to extend this kind of analysis to our improved institutional measures.    Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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Appendix 1: BACH data base. 
BACH contains information on 23 sectors, from the new NACE classification 
(3-digit) (see table A.1). Not all the countries have data for all of the sectors and 
manufacturing sectors are the best represented. Data contained in BACH program are 
disaggregated by size. Each sector is divided in three classes depending on the level of 
turnover: small firms (net turnover inferior to 7 Euro million), medium firms (from 7 to 
40 Euro million of net turnover) and large firms (net turnover greater than 40 Euro 
million
18).  
From 1990 onwards (that is our period of study) there have been some 
improvements in some aspects: decreasing of some biases and increased representation 
(table A.2 has the complete information about representation for each country).  
Data come from the balance sheet and profit and loss account, as well as data 
coming from the information on the notes which expand the scope of financial analysis. 
 
NUMBER  SECTORS AND SUBSECTORS 
100  Energy And Water 
200  Industrial Sectors 
210   Intermediate Products  
211  Extraction Of Metalliferous Ores Preliminary Processing Of Metal 
212  Extraction Of Non-Metalliferous Ores And Manuf. Of Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
213  Chemicals And Man-Made Fibres  
220  Investment Goods And Consumer Durables 
221  Manufacture Of Metal Articles, Mechanical And Instrument Engineering  
222  Electrical And Electronic Equipment Including Office And Computing Equipment 
223  Manufacture Of Transport Equipment 
230  Non.Durable Consumption Goods 
231  Food, Drink And Tobacco 
232  Textiles, Leather And Clothing 
233  Timber And Paper Manufacture, Printing 
234  Other Manufacturing Industries Not Elsewhere Specified  
300  Building And Civil Engineering 
400  Trade 
410  Wholesale Trade, Recovery Services 
420  Sale Of Motor Vehicles, Wholesale And Retail Trade 
430  Retail Trade 
440  Hotels And Restaurants 
500  Transport And Communication   
600  Other Services Not Elsewhere Specified 
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  TABLE 1: Theoretical background.  
Impact on leverage volume 
Panel A 
VARIABLE  LEVERAGE VOLUME 
Size 
(proxied by logarithm of 
total assets) 
­   Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
Myers (1984) 
Internal funds  
(proxied by profitability 
ratio) 
;0\HUVDQG0DMOXI 
­  Jensen (1986) 
 
Collateral  
(proxied by tangible assets)  
­    Assymetric information theory 
Growth opportunities 






Panel B: Institutional factors 
VARIABLE  LEVERAGE VOLUME 
 
Creditor Rights 
­   Ortodox theories (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991, La Porta et 
al. 1998, Fabbri, 2001)  




¯  Jensen and Mecking (1976), Grossman, Hart and Moore 
(1988), La Porta et al. (1999b) 
 
Banking Regulation 
­    Suarez (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Caminal and  
        Matutes (1997) 
Non-debt tax shields 






­      Campbell (1979) 
¯  Subrahmanyan and Titman, (1999) 
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TABLE 2: Institutional variables. 
Panel A: Shareholder and Creditor Protection. 
Shareholder and creditor protection extends La Porta et al (LLSV, 1998a) indexes to include merger 
regulation. We control for specific protection of shareholders. We sum one point to LLSV shareholder 
index, if control of boards of Directors is present (Dir. Cont), that is no restriction to market mechanism. 
When equal treatment to all shareholders is guaranteed we sum one point as well. Thirdly we increase the 
index in one unit more if defensive tactics are absent. Creditor index is an extension of LLSV as it 
includes merger protection to firm operations and creditors.   
 
Regulation  Shareholder protection  Creditor protection 
  LLSV  Dir cont  Eq. treat  def tacts  total  LLSV merger Total 
Austria  2 0 1 1 4 3 0  3 
Belgium  0 0 1 0 1 2 1  3 
Denmark  2 0 1 1 4 3 1  4 
France  3 1 1 0 5 0 0  0 
Germany  1 0 1 1 3 3 0  3 
Italy  1 0 0 0 1 2 0  2 
Japan  4 0 0 0 4 2 0  2 
Netherlands  2 0 0 0 2 2 0  2 
Portugal  3 1 1 0 5 1 0  1 
Spain  4 0 1 0 5 2 0  2 
Usa  5 1 1 1 8 1 0  1 
 
Panel B: Banking Legislation. 
Variable construction has done from comparative studies by InterBank Research Organization (1978) and 
Parejo et al.(1993). Furthermore national laws have been used. Updating taken into consideration since 
1990. There are nine categories. License granting needed, necessity from community, board of directors 
requirements, separation of activities, restriction to participation held in nonfinancial firms and other 
financial entities respectively, restriction to own share holding, loan concentration risk control, merger 
permission, restriction to branch opening.   
 















Austria  1 0 1 0  1+1  1 1 1 0 7 
Belgium  1 1 1 0  1+0  0 1 1 0 6   
Denmark  1 0 1 1  1+1  1 1 1 0 8 
France  1 1 1 0  1+0  0 1 1 0 6 
Germany  1 0 1 0  1+0  0 1 1 0 5 
Italy  1 1 1 0  1+0  0 1 1 1 7 
Japan  1 1 1  1(0)a 0+1 0  1  1 1(0)a 8(6)a 
Netherlands  1 0 1 0  1+0  0 1 1 0 5 
Portugal  1 0 1 0  1+0  0 0 1 0 4 
Spain  1 0 1 0  0+0*  1 1 1 0 5 
Usa  1 1 1 1  1+1  0 1 1  1(0)b  9(8)b 
Note: *Lowest limitation to non financial firm participation, therefore very weak control (almost non 
existence). 
  a: the value in brackets is valid from 1993 on. b: the value in brackets is valid from 1997 on.  
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 TABLE 2:  Institutional variables (cont). 
Panel C: Information requirements. 
Disclosure requirements (disclos) capture all the information available for investors. If annual accounts 
have a strict pattern we sum one unit to the index. If merger information must be public at the same time it 
is communicated to authorities, we add one point. We sum one point for information requirements to 
participate in stock markets. Finally, we sum an extra point when auditing is compulsory for all large firms 
(not only firms participating in capital markets).  
 
  disclosure requirements (disclos) 
  Strict  Merger  stock mkt  auditing  total 
Austria  1 1  1  1  4 
Belgium  1 1  1  1  4 
Denmark  0 1  1  0/1*  2/3* 
France  1 1  1  1  4 
Germany  1 1  1  1  4 
Italy  1 1  1  0  3 
Japan  1 1  1  1  4 
Netherlands 0 0/1*  1  1  2/3* 
Portugal  1 1  1  1  4 
Spain  1 1  1  1  4 
Usa  1 1  1  1  4 
 
*From 1993 the partial score is one and therefore the total value of disclos increased. It reflects a legal 
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TABLE 3: Summary statistics. 
Lever is leverage ratio. Mat is the maturity ratio. Roa is return on assets ratio. Collat is the percentage of 
fixed assets on total assets. Grop accounts for growth opportunities 
.  
Panel A: Summary statistics for Countries and all economic sectors. 
   AUS BEL DNK  FRA GER ITA  JPN NTLS  POR SPA US  avg stdev 
  Mean  0.63 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.66 0.69 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.06 
LEVE Std  0.15 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.03 
  min  0.27 0.13 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.36 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.23 0.33 0.27 0.09 
  max  1.14 0.85 0.93 0.81 0.86 1.53 0.96 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.74 0.95 0.22 
  Mean  0.29 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.43 0.30 0.07 
MATU Std  0.13 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.02 
  min  0.00 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.07 
  max  0.87 0.77 0.59 0.90 0.43 0.72 0.70 0.81 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.14 
  Mean  0.34 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.05 
COLL Std  0.14 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.03 
  min  0.07 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.04 
  max  0.88 0.67 0.63 0.78 0.40 0.76 0.78 0.85 0.95 0.82 0.57 0.74 0.16 
  Mean  0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.02 
GROP Std  -0.17 0.53 -0.09 -0.16 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.42 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.23 
  min  0.77 -7.75 0.28 0.53 -0.24 0.53 0.28 0.42 5.46 0.58 0.36 0.11 3.03 
  max  1.37 2.56 0.54 2.57 0.26 1.19 0.47 0.42 3.41 1.58 0.30 1.33 1.09 
  Mean  0.11 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.02 
ROA  Std 
di t i
-0.04 0.80 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.24 -0.05 0.04  0.05 0.26 
  min  0.03 -3.49 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.03 1.26 0.36 0.03 -0.15 1.17 
  max  0.37  20.29  0.47 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.28 4.77 0.28 0.26 2.51 6.05 
 Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
 
35 
TABLE 3: Summary statistics. (cont.) 
Lever is leverage ratio. Mat is the maturity ratio. Roa is return on assets ratio. Collat is the percentage of 
fixed assets on total assets. Grop accounts for growth opportunities 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for countries and manufacturing sectors. 
   AUS  BEL  DNK  FRA  GER  ITA  JPN  NTL  POR  SPA  US  AVG  STD 
  mea 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.05 
LEV  sdev 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.03 
  min 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.43 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.09 
  max 0.94 0.85 0.93 0.73 0.83 1.53 0.84 0.91 0.82 0.88 0.74 0.91 0.22 
  Mea 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.22 0.43 0.31 0.07 
MAT  Sdev 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.02 
  min 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.07 
  max 0.71 0.77 0.59 0.90 0.43 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.91 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.13 
  Mea 0.35 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.05 
COL  Sdev 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.03 
  Min 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.06 
  Max 0.88 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.40 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.95 0.72 0.57 0.70 0.16 
  Mea 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
GRO  Sdev 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.05 
  Min  -0.53 -0.55 -0.28 -0.53 -0.24 -0.53 -0.28 -0.42 -0.75 -0.58 -0.36 -0.46 0.16 
  Max 0.94 0.92 0.54 2.57 0.26 1.07 0.47 0.24 1.76 1.58 0.30 0.97 0.74 
  Mea 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.02 
ROA  Sdev 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 
  Min  -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.57 -0.36 0.03  -0.10 0.19 
  Max 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.05 
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TABLE 3: Summary statistics (cont). 
Panel C: Summary statistics for economic sectors. 
Lever is leverage ratio, calculated as total debt (banking credit, trade creditors and debenture loans) on 
total assets. Profit is return on assets ratio (profit before tax plus interest and depreciation over total 
assets). Collat is the percentage of tangible assets on total assets. Ntds is non-debt tax shield and is 
proxied by the amount of depreciation and provisions on total assets Grop accounts for growth 
opportunities  (growth rate of value added between t and t+1). Averg presents the arithmetic average 
across country and size for the period 1990-1999. Std. dev. is the standard deviation for the same period 
and median the median across sector and size for 1990-1999. Book data from BACH database 
 
  LEV     MAT     ROA      COL       GR0     
Sect  Mn Sd  Min  Max  Mn Sd  Min  Max  Mn Sd  Min Max  Mn Sd  Min  Max  Mn  Sd  Min Max 
100 0.53  0.17 0.19 0.93 0.49  0.16 0.02 0.91 0.11  0.09 -0.57 0.21 0.53  0.17 0.11 0.95  0.02  0.29 -0.75  2.57 
200 0.58  0.09 0.33 0.82 0.29  0.08 0.12 0.49 0.13  0.02 0.05 0.20  0.28 0.08 0.00 0.45  0.00  0.05 -0.17  0.21 
210 0.53  0.10 0.25 0.80 0.32  0.08 0.12 0.53 0.14  0.04 0.03 0.29  0.32 0.09 0.00 0.51 -0.01  0.07 -0.20  0.37 
211 0.59  0.14 0.31 1.53 0.34  0.14 0.07 0.90 0.11  0.07 -0.36 0.30 0.34  0.13 0.00 0.72  0.02  0.25 -0.58  1.95 
212 0.52  0.11 0.14 0.83 0.35  0.10 0.01 0.71 0.16  0.05 0.06 0.36  0.34 0.09 0.00 0.55 -0.01  0.11 -0.31  0.66 
213 0.52  0.11 0.22 0.79 0.29  0.10 0.03 0.52 0.15  0.03 -0.03 0.24 0.29  0.08 0.00 0.44 -0.01  0.09 -0.35  0.34 
220 0.59  0.09 0.35 0.82 0.25  0.08 0.07 0.48 0.13  0.03 0.02 0.23  0.24 0.07 0.00 0.40  0.00  0.06 -0.18  0.27 
221 0.60  0.09 0.24 0.82 0.25  0.08 0.06 0.48 0.13  0.03 -0.02 0.27 0.23  0.08 0.00 0.41  0.00  0.07 -0.25  0.29 
222 0.58  0.10 0.32 0.86 0.24  0.10 0.03 0.65 0.13  0.04 -0.03 0.27 0.21  0.07 0.00 0.39  0.00  0.13 -0.53  1.11 
223 0.62  0.11 0.27 0.89 0.26  0.11 0.06 0.76 0.11  0.04 -0.11 0.24 0.27  0.09 0.00 0.58  0.02  0.21 -0.53  1.76 
230 0.59  0.09 0.35 0.85 0.31  0.09 0.12 0.61 0.14  0.02 0.08 0.20  0.30 0.08 0.00 0.50 -0.01  0.04 -0.22  0.17 
231 0.59  0.10 0.35 0.86 0.30  0.10 0.06 0.60 0.14  0.03 0.07 0.24  0.32 0.09 0.00 0.56 -0.01  0.07 -0.26  0.22 
232 0.59  0.09 0.33 0.81 0.29  0.11 0.06 0.69 0.13  0.03 0.03 0.21  0.25 0.09 0.00 0.45  0.00  0.07 -0.20  0.27 
233 0.59  0.10 0.26 0.86 0.33  0.11 0.15 0.71 0.14  0.03 0.05 0.22  0.33 0.10 0.00 0.66 -0.01  0.07 -0.28  0.56 
234 0.60  0.09 0.38 0.87 0.29  0.09 0.03 0.52 0.15  0.04 -0.10 0.28 0.30  0.08 0.00 0.48  0.00  0.08 -0.32  0.61 
300 0.72  0.10 0.40 0.91 0.18  0.08 0.03 0.62 0.09  0.03 0.01 0.27  0.16 0.08 0.03 0.53  0.00  0.10 -0.52  0.36 
400 0.69  0.09 0.43 0.92 0.20  0.08 0.06 0.49 0.10  0.04 -0.13 0.18 0.20  0.08 0.08 0.43 -0.05  0.55 -7.75  0.30 
410 0.69  0.09 0.38 0.86 0.17  0.06 0.04 0.37 0.10  0.04 -0.13 0.18 0.15  0.05 0.05 0.27 -0.04  0.32 -3.60  0.35 
420 0.72  0.09 0.42 0.98 0.16  0.09 0.00 0.46 0.10  0.04 -0.04 0.23 0.18  0.08 0.05 0.40  0.01  0.14 -0.40  0.71 
430 0.68  0.11 0.40 0.96 0.24  0.09 0.09 0.49 0.12  0.03 0.03 0.24  0.28 0.09 0.13 0.57 -0.01  0.09 -0.39  0.37 
440 0.63  0.17 0.13 1.14 0.49  0.17 0.00 0.85 0.13  0.05 0.05 0.47  0.53 0.18 0.04 0.86  0.01  0.16 -0.33  1.09 
500 0.59  0.12 0.23 0.97 0.45  0.15 0.14 0.87 0.13  0.32 -1.26 4.77 0.54  0.14 0.21 0.82  0.00  0.55 -5.46  3.41 
600 0.62  0.12 0.33 0.96 0.38  0.14 0.05 0.87 0.18  1.45 -3.49 2.03 0.27  0.13 0.05 0.74 -0.05  0.69 -7.65  2.56 
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TABLE 4: Determinants of leverage. 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry   
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), tangible assets (collat) and non-debt tax shields (ndts). 
Legal variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection 
(share),and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors (in parenthesis) corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. All specifications include time effects. 
 
 Lever  lever  lever  lever  lever 
roa  0.0185**  0.0207*** 0.1137*** 0.1137*** 0.1129*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
collat  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0024*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
size  0.0051 0.0057 0.0913***  0.0913***  0.0925*** 
  (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
amo  -0.1237*** -0.1351*** -0.7643*** -0.7643*** -0.7633*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0266) 
groppor 0.0118**  0.0113**  0.0392***  0.0392***  0.0387*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
bank  0.0057***     0.0104*** 
  (0.0017)     (0.0033) 
disclos   -0.0137***    -0.0299*** 
   (0.0038)    (0.0069) 
share    -0.0435***   -0.0163*** 
    (0.0016)   (0.0017) 
cred     0.0205***  0.0641*** 
     (0.0019)  (0.0048) 
Constant 0.5626*** 0.6506*** 0.8303*** 0.5948*** 0.5633*** 
  (0.0132) (0.0141) (0.0125) (0.0061) (0.0328) 
Obs  5499 5499 5499 5499 5499 















































*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hausman test: a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% and c significant at 10%
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TABLE 5: Determinants of leverage. Interaction effects 
Panel A 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry   
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), tangible assets (collat), growth opportunities (groppor) 
and non-debt tax shields (amo). Legal variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor 
protection (cred), shareholder protection (share),and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) corrected for heteroskedasticity. All specifications include time effects. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 lever  lever  lever  Lever 
roa  0.0186**  0.1130*** 0.1169*** 0.1158*** 
 (0.0073)  (0.0066)  (0.0066)  (0.0066) 
Collat  0.0001  0.0024*** 0.0034*** 0.0033*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Size  0.0054  0.0925*** 0.0942*** 0.0947*** 
 (0.0057)  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0041) 
amo -0.1249***  -0.7638***  -0.7838***  -0.7807*** 
 (0.0358)  (0.0267)  (0.0269)  (0.0269) 
groppor 0.0119**  0.0387***  0.0396***  0.0392*** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0077)  (0.0077)  (0.0077) 
Disclos   -0.0297***    -0.0236*** 
   (0.0070)    (0.0071) 
Share     -0.0164***    -0.0177*** 
   (0.0018)    (0.0018) 
cred   0.0644***  0.0313***  0.0747*** 
   (0.0050)  (0.0029)  (0.0055) 
Bank  0.0086*** 0.0109***    0.0105*** 
 (0.0022)  (0.0038)    (0.0033) 
Bank2 -0.0002**  -0.0000     
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)     
Cred2     -0.0005***  -0.0004*** 
     (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Constant 0.5393***  0.5591***     
 (0.0172)  (0.0363)     
Observations 5499  5499  0.5736***  0.5212*** 
R-squared  0.04  0.40  (0.0074) (0.0343) 
Hausman test 
 


























*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hausman test: a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% and c significant at 10% Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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TABLE 5: Determinants of leverage. Interaction effects 
Panel B 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry   
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), tangible assets (collat), growth opportunities (groppor) 
and non-debt tax shields (amo). Legal variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor 
protection (cred), shareholder protection (share),and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) corrected for heteroskedasticity. All specifications include time effects. 
 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 lever  Lever  lever  Lever 
Roa  0.0207*** 0.1127***  0.1138*** 0.1130*** 
 (0.0073)  (0.0066)  (0.0067)  (0.0066) 
Collat  0.0000 0.0024*** 0.0022***  0.0024*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Size  0.0061 0.0926*** 0.0913***  0.0925*** 
 (0.0057)  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0041) 
amo -0.1349***  -0.7638***  -0.7644***  -0.7633*** 
 (0.0360)  (0.0266)  (0.0267)  (0.0266) 
groppor 0.0242**  0.0811*** 0.0406***  0.0394*** 
 (0.0111)  (0.0206)  (0.0133)  (0.0133) 
bca   0.0103***   0.0104*** 
   (0.0033)   (0.0033) 
accion   -0.0163***  -0.0435***  -0.0163*** 
   (0.0017)  (0.0016)  (0.0017) 
acreed   0.0640***   0.0641*** 
   (0.0048)   (0.0048) 
disclos -0.0136***  -0.0299***    -0.0299*** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0069)   (0.0069) 
dis2 -0.0149  -0.0488**     
 (0.0117)  (0.0220)    
Shar2     -0.0020  -0.0011 
     (0.0161)  (0.0160) 
Constant 0.6503***  0.5643***  0.8303***  0.5634*** 
 (0.0141)  (0.0328)  (0.0125)  (0.0328) 
Observations 5499  5499  5499  5499 
R-squared 0.04  0.40  0.40  0.40 


























*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hausman test: a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% and c significant at 10% Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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TABLE 6: Maturity and banking structure. 
The dependent variable is maturity ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry  attributes are 
profitability (roa), size (logsales), tangible assets (collat) and growth opportunities (groppor). Financial 
structure variables are concentration in the banking sector (concentr), shares owned (sharown), 
participation in other companies (parti) and deposits (depos).   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  matur2 matur2 matur2 
Lever  -0.4749 -0.1843 -0.6129** 
  (0.3065) (0.2674) (0.2666) 
Roa  0.0401*** 0.0416*** 0.0397*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0044) 
Collat  0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Size  -0.1728*** -0.1751*** -0.1729*** 
  (0.0083) (0.0074) (0.0086) 
Groppor -0.0129  -0.0173**  -0.0115 
  (0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0080) 
Depos -0.0254  0.0084  -0.0563 
  (0.0417) (0.0412) (0.0458) 
Sharown  -0.0433** -0.0360** -0.0452** 
  (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0197) 
Parti  0.9391*** 0.8316*** 1.0363*** 
  (0.1720) (0.1543) (0.1832) 
Concentr 0.0226^  0.0332*  -0.0180 
















Obs  4662 4662 4662 
Note: ^significant at 15%, *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7: Robustness. Small and medium sectors 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry 
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), collateral (collat) and non-debt tax shields (amo). Legal 
variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection 
(share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (4) 
 Lever  lever  lever  lever  lever 
Roa  0.0764*** 0.0763*** 0.0754*** 0.0766*** 0.0764*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0073) 
Collar  0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0006*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
logsales  0.0608*** 0.0604*** 0.0562*** 0.0608*** 0.0608*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Amo  -0.5049*** -0.5035*** -0.4934*** -0.5052*** -0.5058*** 
  (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
groppor 0.0313***  0.0311***  0.0310***  0.0328**  0.0541*** 
  (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0130) (0.0202) 
Bca 0.0089***  0.0067*  0.0085**  0.0089***  0.0089*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Disclos -0.0156**  -0.0169**  -0.0255***  -0.0156**  -0.0155** 
  (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
Share  -0.0149*** -0.0144*** -0.0168*** -0.0149*** -0.0150*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Cred  0.0783*** 0.0770*** 0.0487*** 0.0783*** 0.0782*** 
  (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Bank1   0.0002     
   (0.0002)     
Cred2    0.0015***    
     (0.0002)     
Shar2     -0.0025   
       (0.0165)   
Dis2      -0.0271 
      (0.0220) 
Constant  0.5116*** 0.5314*** 0.6245*** 0.5116*** 0.5120*** 
  (0.0347) (0.0390) (0.0386) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Observations  3755 3755 3755 3755 3755 





399.62a 680.30a 231.04a 212.94a 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hausman test: a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% and c significant at 10%Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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 TABLE 8: Robustness. Larger sectors 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry 
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), collateral (intang) and non-debt tax shields (ndts). Legal 
variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection 
(share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lever  lever  lever  Lever  lever 
roa  -0.6474***  -0.6547*** -0.8784*** -0.6477*** -0.6448*** 
  (0.0526)  (0.0524) (0.0420) (0.0526) (0.0526) 
Collat  0.0018***  0.0021*** 0.0044*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Size  0.0945***  0.0947*** 0.1585*** 0.0945*** 0.0946*** 
  (0.0068)  (0.0068) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
Amo  -0.4987***  -0.5091*** -0.8145*** -0.4991*** -0.4973*** 
  (0.0481)  (0.0481) (0.0277) (0.0482) (0.0482) 
groppor  0.0303***  0.0291*** 0.0471*** 0.0230  0.0681* 
  (0.0109)  (0.0109) (0.0097) (0.0241) (0.0366) 
Bca  0.0145***  0.0230*** 0.0209*** 0.0145*** 0.0144*** 
  (0.0049)  (0.0055) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
disclos -0.0258***  -0.0218**  -0.0139*  -0.0258***  -0.0260*** 
  (0.0094)  (0.0095) (0.0074) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
Share  -0.0135***  -0.0147*** -0.0151*** -0.0135*** -0.0135*** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
cred -0.0278***  -0.0246***  0.1110***  -0.0278***  -0.0278*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Bank2    -0.0008***     
    (0.0002)     
Cred2     -0.0027***    
     (0.0003)    
Shar2      0.0091   
      (0.0268)   
Dis2       -0.0413 
       (0.0382) 
Constant  0.7516***  0.6851*** 0.3951*** 0.7515*** 0.7527*** 
  (0.0434)  (0.0473) (0.0401) (0.0434) (0.0434) 
Observations  1744  1744 3993 1744 1744 
R-squared  0.48  0.48 0.50 0.48 0.48 
Hausman test  3474.99 
 
49.98a 43.67a 38.75b 2842.09a 
Note:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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 TABLE 9: Robustness. Manufacturing sectors 
 
The dependent variable, lever, is the leverage ratio on industry k and country i at time t. Industry 
attributes are profitability (roa), size (logsales), collateral (collat) and non-debt tax shields (amo). Legal 
variables included are banking regulation (bank), creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection 
(share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  lever Lever  lever lever lever 
roa  -0.8944*** -0.9014*** -0.8784*** -0.8943*** -0.8907*** 
  (0.0425) (0.0424) (0.0420) (0.0425) (0.0425) 
Collat  0.0030*** 0.0036*** 0.0044*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
logsales  0.1576*** 0.1588*** 0.1585*** 0.1576*** 0.1572*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0053) 
Amo  -0.7689*** -0.7804*** -0.8145*** -0.7689*** -0.7689*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0276) 
groppor  0.0506*** 0.0495*** 0.0471*** 0.0449**  0.1260*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0193) (0.0239) 
Bca  0.0205*** 0.0340*** 0.0209*** 0.0205*** 0.0204*** 
  (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
disclos -0.0317***  -0.0249***  -0.0139*  -0.0317***  -0.0325*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
Share  -0.0194*** -0.0225*** -0.0151*** -0.0194*** -0.0192*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
cred  0.0552*** 0.0633*** 0.1110*** 0.0552*** 0.0554*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0075) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Cred2    -0.0027***    
   (0.0003)    
bank2   -0.0011***     
  (0.0002)     
Shar2     0.0075   
    (0.0219)   
Dis2      -0.0894*** 
     (0.0259) 
Constant  0.5994*** 0.4824*** 0.3951*** 0.5992*** 0.6019*** 
  (0.0351) (0.0405) (0.0401) (0.0351) (0.0351) 
Observations  3993 3993 3993 3993 3993 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 
Hausman test   1403.25a  177.69a  658.19a  667.19a  5375.02a 
Note: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hausman test: a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% and c significant at 10%   Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure 
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 TABLE 10: ROBUSTNESS. EXCLUDING COUNTRIES 
 
The first column reports the results for the total sample. The following columns present the results 
obtained when eliminating the cited country. Blank cells means non significant result. 
 
  total AUS BEL DEN FRA GER ITA JAP  NET  POR SPA USA 
Roa  + + + + + + +  +  +  + + + 
Collat + + + + + + +  +  +  + + + 
Size  + + + + + + +  +  +  + + + 
Amo  - - - - - - -  -  -  - - - 
Bank + + + + + + +  +  +  + + + 
Cred  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  - 
Share  - - - - - - -  -  -  - - - 
Disclos  - - - - - - -  -  -  - -   
 
 
  